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Jonathan White (London School of Economics) 
Lea Ypi (London School of Economics) 
 
 
The Politics of Peoplehood 
 
 
Contemporary political theory has made the question of the ‘people’ a topic of sustained analysis. This 
article identifies two broad approaches taken – norm-based and contestation-based – and, noting some 
problems left outstanding, goes on to advance a complementary account centred on partisan practice. It 
suggests the definition of ‘the people’ is closely bound up in the analysis of political conflict, and that 
partisans engaged in such conflict play an essential role in constructing and contesting different 
principled conceptions. The article goes on to show how such an account does not lead to a normatively 
hollow, purely historical conception of ‘the people’, but rather highlights the normative importance of 
practices that, at the minimum, de-naturalise undesirable conceptions of the people and, at their best, 
give political legitimacy and a representative basis to those one might wish to see prosper.  
 
 
In democratic theory and practice, the concept of the people is used to evoke that agent in the 
name of whom power should be exercised if it is to be considered justified. Yet what a people 
is and how it can be legitimately constituted is a matter of enduring dispute. If we follow the 
larger part of democratic theory, we find two prominent approaches. The first tends to see 
political practice as secondary to a prior normative account of what counts as the people. Call 
this the norm-based approach to peoplehood. The second emphasises that the people can only 
truly be identified in the context of ongoing, if radically incomplete, adversarial encounters. 
Call this the contestation-based approach to the people. 
Norm-based accounts are often criticised for depoliticising the question, relegating the 
people to passive recipients of independently valid moral standards and neglecting the role of 
active political participation in shaping power and its justification. Contestation-based 
accounts are criticised for overly politicising the question, sacrificing normative criteria to an 
indiscriminate account of adversarial political exchange with little space for reflection on the 
plausibility of the claims advanced. This article defends an intermediate position. The 
question of the people, we suggest, is answered when evoked and given definition in an 
ongoing clash between political projects. Such projects must be of a principled nature, rooted 
in conflicting views about how power is legitimately exercised, and embedded in appropriate 
processes of public political justification. The relevant processes, we argue, are those where 
‘the people’ is invoked by representative agents whose democratic function is to exercise 
power in the name of the people, and whose raison d'etre is to show on what normative 
grounds this exercise is justified.   
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The article proceeds as follows. We begin with an outline of norm-based and 
contestation-based accounts of the people. After highlighting some of their important 
limitations, we turn to an analysis of the agents and practices by which the politics of 
peoplehood is appropriately shaped. We explain and defend here the central place of 
partisanship. Understood as a cross-temporal associative practice required to sustain and 
enhance political commitment, partisanship has been the archetypal form taken by political 
adversarialism in modern democracy (White and Ypi, forthcoming). A normative account of 
partisanship, sympathetic to yet critical of existing practices, is crucial to understanding how 
conflict might contribute to the ongoing configuration of peoplehood in a principled way. It 
elucidates how the exercise of power in the name of the people may remain anchored in ideas-
based exchange and subject to ongoing requirements of political justification.  
We deepen this argument by examining the role of partisanship in both constructing and 
contesting the people. Regarding the former, ‘the people’ is the political agent in whose name 
partisans exercise political power, casting themselves as a party oriented to the public good 
rather than a faction oriented to private interests (White and Ypi, forthcoming, ch.2). 
Regarding contestation, defining ‘the people’ is a matter of ongoing partisan clash, for it 
corresponds to that aspect of adversarial encounter critical to determining its development: the 
scope of conflict.  Moves to cast ‘the people’ in broad terms, co-extensive with state 
boundaries or reaching across them, versus moves to cast ‘the people’ as a subset of a state’s 
citizenry, or indeed to suppress the category altogether, are central to efforts to control who 
participates in the conflict and how.  Partisanship is uniquely marked by efforts to give 
definition to ‘the people’.1   
As a distinctively intergenerational practice, and one oriented to the validation of 
political claims in representative institutions, partisanship promises to bring legitimating 
resources to the structuring of peoplehood that alternative forms of political agency lack. As a 
practice inherently structured by the appeal to normative programmes whose public 
justification takes adversarial form, partisanship structures political conflict in a principled 
way. No other agents in democracy can combine legitimacy and innovation in like fashion. 
No other agents can engage in institutional processes of political justification in a way that 
both respects their legitimacy constraints but at the same time works to transcend them. 
By bringing partisanship to the fore, we bring together two aspects of peoplehood often 
treated as only loosely connected.  One concerns the boundaries of the population from which 
citizens are drawn, typically understood as a foundational, constitutional question.  The other 
concerns the composition of the active citizenry, of those enfranchised and mobilised to 
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participate in political decision-making.  Both shape how the principle of popular sovereignty 
comes to be institutionalised and enacted in a given setting.  Our contention is that a 
normative analysis of peoplehood needs to be sensitive to both dimensions (see also Bauböck 
2015, pp. 2-3), and that partisanship is significant in part for the very reason that it bears 
directly on both.  Partisans continue the process of people-making beyond the constitutional 
determination of a population’s boundaries into the exercise of political rights in day-to-day 
politics. 
It is important to stress at the outset that not all facts of partisan life are relevant to 
normative enquiry.  Commitment to basic standards of political justification would seem a 
minimal component of an ethically defensible partisanship.
2
  Realworld partisanship may 
involve many other practices besides, not all of them easily lauded.  Although for some critics 
our necessarily selective appreciation of partisanship moves the argument closer to the 
philosopher’s shelf than one might want to concede,  the moral failures displayed by particular 
partisan activities can hardly go unacknowledged.  Our account is informed by partisanship in 
its most sympathetic form. 
 
 
1.  The People as Norm  
 
The question of how power is justified and who should have a share in its exercise has a long 
pedigree in the history of political thought. Aristotle begins Book III of The Politics arguing 
that to understand the essential nature of a polity and what form of rule is adequate to it we 
must first ask about the essential nature of those who constitute it: the people (or what he calls 
the polites). He distinguishes different notions of who is part of the people, noting that the 
answer to the question depends on the kind of constitution in place in a given polity and 
arguing that, in a democracy, the people will be those who ‘have the right to participate in 
deliberative and judicial office’ (Politics, III, 1275b). Yet this raises the further question of 
how such rights ought to be defined, since only then, Aristotle emphasizes, can we decide 
whether one comes to be part of the people ‘rightly or wrongly’ and ‘if wrongly’ whether one 
can be considered part of the people ‘at all’, since ‘“wrongly” means the same as “not truly”’ 
(Politics, III, 1276a).  
Aristotle puts forward the first norm-based conception of the people. To know what a 
people is we need to know who has a claim to be considered part of the people, and to know 
who has such a claim we need to reflect on the different candidate criteria that might guide us 
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in deciding whether one is part of the people ‘rightly’ or ‘wrongly’. He further discusses 
peoplehood as shaped through revolution or the subversion of a previous regime leading to 
the modification of existing territorial boundaries, and in the end settles for a definition of 
peoplehood restricted to active members of the polity: a people is whoever is entitled to a 
share in government, regardless of how that government came about. Yet in arriving at this 
view he notes other ways in which a norm-based conception of the people might proceed, 
contrasting for example active citizenship with a more latent conception of the people that 
might include resident aliens, or with a third that confers citizenship on the basis of common 
descent (Politics, III, 1275a-b).  Of course, Aristotle says intentionally little about the 
underlying population from which the citizenry is drawn – the polis is his assumed frame of 
reference, and he does not want to radically question its spatial extension – but in developing 
an account of the citizen body he indicates a method that would later be extended. 
The different definitions of peoplehood identified by Aristotle continue to play a role in 
contemporary democratic theory, where the norm-based conception of the people retains its 
initial attraction. Several scholars share with Aristotle an understanding of peoplehood 
established through an analysis of shared citizen practices, regardless of how such practices 
were initially established (Miller 1997, 2009; Walzer 1983). Others appeal to less narrow 
criteria, such as the all-affected interests principle (Arrhenius 2005, Goodin 2007). Others still 
emphasize the relevance of a shared coercive order and its implications for the life of those 
whom it subjects (Abizadeh 2008, 2010). A more pessimistic line of thought stresses the 
inescapably arbitrary distribution of these entitlements, due to the logical impossibility of 
using democratic mechanisms (principally, the vote) to constitute those who are to be the 
subject of democratic mechanisms (Whelan 1983, Dahl 1989).  
Treating the question of the people as settled through an analysis of contending norms 
has obvious appeal. Firstly, it promises to be action-guiding: if we can identify the right 
principle according to which the people should be defined, then we can refer to it in settling 
further questions, e.g. to do with disputed boundaries. Secondly, it promises legitimacy: if we 
know who has a valid claim to peoplehood, we know to whom power must be responsive and 
how it can be exercised legitimately. Let the question of the people remain unsettled and 
democratic institutions will always face a fundamental problem that the democratic process 
itself seems unable to resolve. If we can identify appropriate criteria by which peoplehood 
may be defined to begin with, we enter the realm of day-to-day politics with greater 
confidence that decisions emanate from a valid source and are not arbitrarily imposed on 
those who might legitimately contest them. 
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Yet the norm-based conception of the people also has limitations. Firstly, by 
depoliticising the question of peoplehood in the way described, it relegates those who are 
supposedly exercising power in a legitimate way to the role of mere recipients of 
independently articulated norms, ones that may or may not result from a political process in 
which they had a voice. Those intended to be the subjects of these norms may thereby be 
deprived of opportunities to influence and develop attachments to those norms.  The account 
misconceives the proper relation between norms and practices, treating standards of 
normative justification as feasibly developed in isolation from practices of political 
contestation rather than generated in critical dialogue with them.
3
  
Secondly, even if we grant that philosophical reflection alone could settle the question 
of peoplehood at a particular moment in time, social and political norms must be adapted to 
an evolving historical context. Future disagreements over any previously agreed norms are 
hardly possible to avoid. The normative criteria that help us address these questions at one 
time may no longer be adequate later. That accounts of the people remain politically 
challengeable, and that no interpretation achieve such dominance as to go unquestioned, is 
therefore desirable even if we could settle on an appropriate norm-based conception.  
Assessment of the continued importance or obsolescence of particular normative criteria has 
to remain open to ongoing historical processes of collective negotiation in which political 
agents themselves articulate what they understand by power and who that power ought to be 
justified to.  
Finally, it is important not to forget that the need for political institutions arises from the 
persistent problem of social conflict. The exercise of political power is necessary precisely 
because no spontaneous order can be relied upon to solve disagreements. Political theorists as 
diverse as Machiavelli and Kant or Schmitt and Rawls have all agreed on this point. But if 
this is so, understanding the structure of conflicts, who is party to them, and for what reasons, 
seems essential to understanding what kind of power can be justified. This in turn requires an 
analysis of the adversarial practices that shape and give visibility to the claims of different 
parties. Hence the question of norms resists being fixed prior to an analysis of the sources of 
conflict and an assessment and exchange of the reasons that different parts to it put forward – 
a point to which we shall return.
4
  
The norm-based conception of the people is incomplete in other words without an 
account of how such norms are evoked and practically enacted in day-to-day politics. Such 
political exchanges play an important role in displaying, also (at their best) revising or 
updating any previously settled norm. Consider for example the active definition of 
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peoplehood Aristotle puts forward: a people is made up by all those who are entitled to 
citizenship rights in a particular political community, regardless of the process through which 
such rights came to be established (i.e. whether through revolution, usurpation or peaceful 
annexation of another territory). If people participate in office by virtue of their claim to be 
involved in judicial and deliberative bodies, the decisions made by such bodies reflect their 
say and could not be regarded as arbitrarily imposed. This in turn implies that those to whom 
power should be justified also have a say in how that power is exercised: they are self-
governing and the rules on the basis of which they conduct their life in common are 
considered legitimate and binding for everyone.  
‘The people’ becomes a hollow idea if it is not underpinned by practical enactment in 
public life. If those who are entitled to be part of the people systematically cease to actively 
exercise their political rights, they end up being excluded (formally and de facto) by those left 
making rules to their own advantage. History suggests that whenever people cease to defend 
their rights, they are more vulnerable to losing them, including the fundamental right to be 
part of the people.  This thought is picked up in the contemporary empirical literature on 
declining voter turnout, which is concerned precisely with the challenges to legitimacy that 
the retreat of the people from active decision-making poses to contemporary democracies 
(Offe 2013).  This point is accentuated if we keep in mind the second well-founded concern 
raised in connection with declining political participation: that it leads to a more unequal 
distribution of participation (Offe 2013: 198, see also Kohler 2006; Gallego 2007; Solt 2010). 
The active people becomes truncated along several dimensions of stratification, including 
income, education, class, status, security and life satisfaction, with those at the bottom of the 
scale typically excluded (Offe 2013: 198). This in turn has a significant impact on future 
political decisions that contribute both to framing the circumstances of new conflicts and to 
informing the potential alternatives for addressing them. The less people participate, the less 
decisions reflect their will, and the more political rule is tailored to the needs and interests of 
the most advantaged. As one scholar puts it, the net result is a circular dynamic where an 
allegedly democratic system is systematically ‘biased to favour the middle class and everyone 
above it, while depriving all those below it of the effective use of their political resources – 
i.e. the political rights of citizenship’ (Offe 2013: 198). The legitimacy credentials of the 
entire political system are undermined to the degree that one may plausibly ask whether it 
really is based on democratic rule by the people, as opposed say to an oligarchy of those with 
education, money and status who make coercively-binding decisions for all.
5
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One might respond that this points only to the limitations of one way of defining those 
norms on the basis of which the people are to be defined (the active exercise of political 
office), and that there might be others not as sensitive to empirical changes in who actually 
has a say. Norm-based perspectives centred on affected interests or subjection to a shared 
coercive order as what defines a people might be thought relatively immune to such 
challenges. Yet, as many historians of ideas emphasise, it would be naive to insist that the 
very meaning of what counts as being affected, or what counts as exercising coercion over 
someone, or what counts as an interest, can be articulated and interpreted in isolation from the 
political context in which interpretations relating to such concepts take shape – even if we 
maintain that one can critically reflect on the existing use of concepts and in many ways 
refine and improve on them (Skinner 2002, Pocock 2009). 
Thus even if we accept that the norm-based conception of the people helps provide an 
initially satisfactory answer to the question of to whom power should be responsive in order 
to be justified, it does not suffice to maintain connection with the political dynamic through 
which norms are negotiated. Conceptions of ‘the people’ need to remain sensitive to how 
relevant claims continue to be invoked and interpreted by political agents in democratic life. 
Norms must be treated as part of an ongoing process of claim and counter-claim. A 
perspective which seeks to adjudicate them only philosophically, without looking to how they 
are substantively endorsed in political exchange, deprives them of their relationship to 
political action and change.  Only by relating the problem of who the people are to ongoing 
political conflicts can we give renewed attention to the stakes bound up in such conflicts, 
thereby contesting both external exclusions (having to do with the boundaries of those who 
are entitled to press particular claims) and internal exclusions (those who have such claims 
but no longer act upon them). And only in this way can we expect a determination of 
peoplehood to maintain a lastingly legitimate and representative basis.  
Notice, however, that to say that a norm-based account of the people is conditioned by 
the adversarial circumstances of politics is not the same as saying that it must therefore be 
determined by them. In this lies one of the main differences between the partisan perspective 
advocated in this article and more familiar contestation-based approaches, to which we now 
turn.  
  
 
2. The People as Contestation 
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There is a second family of approaches to the question of peoplehood. It emphasizes the 
importance of contestation – of who is appealed to and activated in the context of a political 
cause proposed in the name of ‘the people’, and who becomes involved in counter-initiatives 
to contest such moves.  Approached in this fashion, ‘the people’ becomes the subject of 
competing representations pitted against each other in adversarial encounters. The question of 
peoplehood is, on this view, not something that can be settled by appeal to a single criterion: 
the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion are subject to perpetual revision. The circle of those 
enjoying citizenship rights in a given polity is by no means the final word: it is only through 
acts of political mobilisation that the contours of ‘the people’ as a meaningful empirical 
constellation can be shaped. 
Advanced in particular by scholars in the radical-democratic tradition (Honig 2009; 
Frank 2010; Kalyvas 2005; see also Smith 2003), this approach marks a concerted move to 
repoliticise the question of peoplehood.  The constitution of ‘the people’ is treated as a 
persistent concern of political life.  That the contours of peoplehood may be decided 
exclusively at a distinct ‘constitutional moment’, at the founding of a polity or in a period of 
extreme crisis, is viewed sceptically.  Rather than looking to these rare events as the principal 
moments in which ‘the people’ is summoned into being, its emergence is seen as gradually 
unfolding. Without necessarily denying the distinction between normal and constitutional 
politics – that there are certain moments in which radical change is effected to the dominant 
conceptions of peoplehood seems historically accurate (Ackerman 1991, 1998) – it is 
emphasised that the memory and meaning of these events is continually revisited.  Their 
significance cannot be separated from the political clashes through which they subsequently 
come to be refracted. The contemporary world offers several examples, including debates on 
the inclusion of currently disenfranchised groups (e.g. prisoners, the mentally disabled and 
children), those who come to the polity from outside (i.e. various forms of immigrant) or 
those who reside permanently in another polity with whom existing members wish to evoke 
relations of equivalence and solidarity.  The spectral character of ‘the people’ for democratic 
politics in general has been a central theme of recent theoretical and historical literature in this 
tradition (see also Mouffe 2000; Honig 2007).   
Conceiving the people as a practical enactment is instructive in empirical terms because 
it helps us to make sense of the many everyday political contexts in which ideas of ‘the 
people’ are invoked as rallying-cry (Canovan 2005; Laclau 2005).  Numerous are the protest 
movements that seek to mobilise in these terms – often in ways that challenge the equation of 
peoplehood with polity membership, the rights of citizenship, or some form of national 
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belonging.
6
  Peoplehood has historically shown itself to be a persistently contentious, even 
explosive, political theme.  Scholarship in this tradition has usefully traced this back to an 
uneasy tension between legally authorised representations of ‘the people’ and equivalent 
claims emerging from civil society – the heart of the so-called ‘paradox of politics’ (Honig 
2009).   
Approaching the people in this way also has normative appeal, to do with denaturalising 
ideas of peoplehood and thereby exposing them to critique.  Insofar as no single perspective 
on the people can claim permanent legitimacy, the effort to find legitimacy must be sensitive 
to changing political circumstances and must involve submitting all claims to scrutiny (cf. 
Näsström 2007, p.644; Honig 2009, pp.15-16). Without the interrogation of counter-
perspectives, the exclusions that necessarily follow from the application of any single 
principle to settle the people issue risk sedimentation.  Even in political contexts where none 
of the conceptions of peoplehood articulated in conflict are judged desirable (e.g. a clash 
between two culturalist visions, regional and national), the very fact of contestation puts each 
in question and hinders the formation of an undesirable hegemony. 
Yet however compelling this approach may be, it leaves a number of important 
questions unresolved.  Any account which foregrounds political action and conflict needs to 
distinguish between its acceptable and unacceptable forms, and between the different kinds of 
agent making such claims.  There is a risk of ‘over-politicising’ the question of peoplehood, 
such that one becomes insensitive to the different ways claims are advanced in the public 
sphere and the different institutional sites in which they are articulated. Insofar as definitions 
of peoplehood are to some degree ‘always exclusionary’ (Smith 2003, p. 56), what are the 
more and less legitimate forms of exclusion?  To what extent can a given act of exclusion be 
given public justification, and to what extent is such justification dependent on a distinctive 
form of political agency?  However important the focus on claims-making as a political 
practice, it needs to be coupled with an account of how normative standards make themselves 
visible in that practice.  To celebrate unruly contestation per se is an intellectual dead-end: 
contestation without norms is as problematic as norms without contestation.  While there have 
been some important attempts in the radical-democratic tradition to distinguish between 
different forms of contestation, as with the distinction between agonistic and antagonistic 
encounters (Mouffe 2000), there has been little examination of how this might find expression 
in the different kinds of associative practice that structure political life.  
More specifically, if peoplehood is to be shaped politically, to what agents and 
institutional sites should one look for its systematic contestation?  Who can claim the 
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legitimacy and representative basis required to politicise it in a desirable and democratic 
fashion?  Existing theorisations of the people as a contestatory practice tend to be agnostic on 
the organisational forms political conflict may take. This is a function perhaps of a wider 
agnosticism towards how radical democracy might be institutionalised (Schaap 2007).  Where 
examples of the political contestation of peoplehood are cited, often social movements figure 
prominently (e.g. Frank 2010; Honig 2009).  The underlying intuition however seems to be 
that one should be receptive to contestation in all its forms, and that marginalised groups 
themselves are the most reliable agents of their claims to political inclusion.  If however, as 
argued above, equality of political participation is crucial to the enacting of peoplehood in a 
normatively acceptable way, and if significant asymmetries of power will need to be 
overcome, it may be that spontaneous forms of mobilisation are insufficiently reliable (White 
2015).  They may be too opaque, too impermanent, and too uneven in their social make-up to 
connect everyday civic practices adequately with principled concerns and commitments (cf. 
Näsström 2014, p.550). Rather, one may need to look at forms of political agency that 
explicitly aim to articulate and represent principled visions of society, that seek institutional 
validation for their claims, and that have an enduring public profile that outlives those isolated 
moments in which peoplehood is contested with the highest intensity.    
Hence, whilst sharing these scholars’ interest in the contribution of political action to 
political theory, we seek to further develop their analysis by examining more closely the 
agents and process that can actualise a contestation-based account of the people without 
divorcing it from the people-as-norm.  Our account builds on existing views of the relevance 
of conflict for normative theory by examining how political conflict bears on the definition of 
the people, referring to the practices of partisanship as a form of contestation which links 
legitimate (legislative and executive) decision-making processes to efforts to articulate and 
shape citizens' political will in accordance with normative principles. 
 
 
3. The People as Partisan Process 
 
Partisanship is an associative practice involving an institutionally mediated, coordinated and 
continuous effort by political agents to shape collective life in accordance with principled 
views of what power is and how it should be exercised (White and Ypi, forthcoming). From a 
normative perspective, it is best understood as a way of sustaining and enhancing political 
commitments, where these are understood as irreducible to the sectoral interests of a pre-
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political grouping (i.e. one to which allegiance is justified on grounds of self-interest or 
identity rather than principle).
7
 Partisans articulate such commitments in the name of the 
whole rather than the part, even if they are aware that the views they put forward are subject 
to reasonable disagreement (Sartori 1976, Rosenblum 2008, Muirhead 2014, White and Ypi, 
forthcoming).  They do so as part of an adversarial process in which others advance counter-
claims based on differing interpretations of what power is and how it can be justified.  
What makes partisanship a distinctively important contribution to the shaping and 
reshaping of peoplehood?  Most fundamentally, it is a mode of political agency that combines 
a principled orientation with politically-legitimated projects seeking to structure institutions 
accordingly.  Partisans define themselves by normative attachments, by an interpretation of 
what serves generalizable ends.  Yet they commit themselves also to action – to convincing 
others of the appeal of their commitments and to taking institutional steps to advance their 
realisation in a way that is publically legitimated.  It is a mode of political agency in which the 
normative and the contestatory come together, and do so consistently across time.   
The politics of peoplehood is central to the partisan attitude.  It is by advocating their 
commitments in the name of ‘the people’ that partisans seek to define their collective purpose, 
differentiate themselves from self-serving groups, and thereby develop a wide constituency of 
support consistent with the claimed generalisability of their principled projects.
8
  ‘The people’ 
can be understood as a necessary component of the partisan claim to non-particularity. Yet it 
is not just an appeal in rhetoric.  That partisan claim stems from a distinctive attempt to 
channel conflicts on the basis of principled commitments, commitments which themselves are 
continuously revised and corrected as part of a political process carrying legitimacy and a 
broad representative basis. An important part of these partisan exchanges concerns the 
constituency of justification itself: to whom do such commitments appeal, who is included 
and excluded, and for what reason? In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 
socialisation of conflict tended to take the form of efforts to extend the franchise 
(Schattschneider 1975). The idea of ‘contagion from the left’ describes how the socialist 
model of the mass party came to be imitated across the political spectrum, thereby expanding 
the scope of political conflict to a much broader social base (Duverger 1954). Earlier still, the 
very emergence of popular sovereignty was as an act of enlarging the scope of conflict from a 
private situation – the monarch vs. each individual subject – to a socialised one – the monarch 
vs. an expanding collective rallied under the name of ‘the people’.  In more recent years the 
focus has extended to transnational conflicts as they relate to commercial, legal and political 
practices of a global nature, such that the constituencies of partisan justification are 
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continuously revised following different normative views of what power (regional, domestic 
and international) is and to whom it should be justified.  
Reshaping ‘the people’ has therefore always been a distinctive aim of partisans 
attempting to correct the exclusions involved in competing ways of categorizing those 
implicated in the exercise of political power. It is through this move that they have sought to 
involve previously detached social groups (e.g. an economic class, or an ethnic or religious 
group) and bring them onto the legal and political stage. And once mass enfranchisement was 
achieved, it was the willingness of the masses to become politically involved, to engage in 
collective action and to vote which was at stake, with contending partisans seeking to re-
invoke the original spirit of ‘the people’ to this end.  In all such cases, the concept was to 
make its appearance in the context of partisan activity and was appealed to as a means to 
shape and articulate conflict, thereby cultivating the people as an active political force, not 
just as the passive bearers of rights.  Of course, as we shall later acknowledge, such civic 
constructions of the people may not be characteristic of all forms of partisanship. Indeed, in 
the real world they are often in tension with more ethnic understandings, involving attempts to 
exclude members of groups who do not share certain ethnic characteristics. But the fact that 
even undesirable forms of partisanship must articulate their claims in public and by appeal to 
generalizable principles (even if objectionable ones) acts to channel political conflict within 
the parameters of political legitimacy.  
As agents embedded in an institutional structure, albeit one always subject to critical 
scrutiny, partisans contest the boundaries of peoplehood most visibly by contesting the 
boundaries of a state’s active citizenry.  They contest the make-up of those enfranchised and 
mobilised to participate politically, within a population already politically constituted.  
Because the commitments they articulate are intended to be broad in their social appeal, there 
is no necessary link between their constituency of support and an existing political territory.  
Historically this is illustrated by moves to expand enfranchisement beyond national and ethnic 
boundaries, as in the case of the French revolutionaries’ attempt to extend the category of 
citizens to all those who shared the ideals of the Revolution (Merker 2009).  Partisanship 
extending across state borders, guided by a common supranational ideological orientation, has 
been witnessed in more recent history, sometimes resulting in the founding of institutions that 
tend towards a fundamentally reconstituted people (White 2014).  The partisan process of 
defining the people thus takes place on a continuum extending from the reshaping of who 
participates in existing political institutions to the revision of institutional arrangements 
themselves.  
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It is worth underlining the specificity of this partisan process of people-formation 
relative to the broader family of contestation-based accounts described earlier.  At 
exceptional moments – times of revolution, crisis or heightened polarisation – spontaneous 
forms of mobilisation may lead to a similar contestation of peoplehood-claims backed by 
far-reaching political participation.
9
  Partisanship however is about commitment to an 
ongoing project with institutional roots – it is about bridging the exceptional moments and 
seeking to ensure that acts of engagement are cumulative.  It is a distinctively 
intergenerational practice (White 2015).  This matters because to fashion a norm-sensitive 
delineation of peoplehood in practical politics is typically a long-term process.  It requires 
persistent effort both to make initial advances and build popular attachments to them, and to 
defend them against subsequent reversal.  Any account of people-formation through the 
practices of contestation must reckon with the problem that achievements can ‘vanish the 
moment we disperse’ (Näsström 2014, p.550).  As associates in an intergenerational project, 
partisans are those who do not easily disperse.  The cross-temporal character of the 
endeavour is a crucial addition to the more general practices of contestation identified by 
agonist thinkers. 
Furthermore, partisanship is centrally concerned with harnessing institutional power, 
typically by gaining control of elected executive and legislative institutions.  This establishes 
a particularly close link between ideas of peoplehood, their politico-legal enactment, and their 
public legitimation.  Whether in the form of setting the criteria of access to citizenship rights, 
deciding public policy, or determining the centralisation and decentralisation of decision-
making capacity, partisans not only exert a direct influence on how peoplehood is practically 
configured, but do so through the institutional procedures that grant legitimacy to these 
interventions.
10
   
The point may seem counter-intuitive: what legitimacy can these institutions offer, one 
may wonder, if the composition of the people that authorises them is considered in need of 
amendment?  The answer is a provisional legitimacy.
11
  Insofar as the procedures of these 
institutions are based on unjustifiable exclusions, it is clear their legitimacy is incomplete, 
possibly significantly so.  But they offer some measure of legitimising capacity nonetheless.  
Through mechanisms of election and public debate, they go some way to validating agents’ 
claims to be articulating commitments of generalizable significance and to be responding to 
lived experience.  To the extent that their procedures remain open to revision, they are 
susceptible to correction: as a process, they may attain a legitimacy that exceeds the 
legitimacy of their make-up at a particular moment.  Partisan practice exists in a mutually 
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reinforcing relation with this institutional process, on the one hand driving it forward, on the 
other drawing provisional legitimation from it.  Whether what is at stake is the reform of 
existing institutions or the establishment of new (e.g. supra-statal) institutions, the long-term 
embeddedness of partisans in these mediating structures is a distinctive legitimising resource. 
That the forging of peoplehood acquires legitimacy when approached as an ongoing 
process is an observation others have made.  Habermas speaks of ‘popular sovereignty as 
procedure’ (Habermas 1996; cf. 1998).  His account of the perpetual reworking of society’s 
composition – the retroactive revision of an historical contingency – can be considered an 
account of the people as process in which enlightened self-reflection is the principal motor 
(see also Benhabib 2011, 2008; Forst forthcoming, 2015).  If such a process is to be genuinely 
inclusive, however, it requires mechanisms by which participation can be elicited.  Any 
account of such a process needs to identify agents who can lead it and draw in the 
involvement of others. These agents should have an extended temporal presence, so practices 
of contestation can be maintained and so decisions taken in the present may be linked to the 
cross-temporal process of people-redefinition that underpins their legitimacy.  Habermas 
sketches the structural requirements of such a process, but has little to say about the 
modalities by which it may be achieved (cf. Ochoa Espejo 2011, p.112).  
Seyla Benhabib and Rainer Forst also emphasise the importance of political agency in 
linking justice and transnational democracy, and mention legislative and executive 
institutions, human rights organisations, social movements and pro-immigration campaigns as 
relevant sites of democratic will-formation contributing to reshaping the people (Benhabib 
2011, esp. ch. 6; Forst, forthcoming 2015, ch. 10). Yet they are vague on what distinguishes 
these agents from each other, how and why they contribute to the enactment of popular 
sovereignty, and how they differ from interest groups, transnational corporations, or business 
lobbies. Though scholars in this tradition note the importance of identifying genuine 
justification (or communicative freedom) by recourse to certain formal preconditions 
imposing constraints on the kinds of reason exchanged (e.g. the equality of discursive agents, 
their symmetrical entitlement to speech acts and the reciprocity of communicative roles), they 
seldom extend this reflection to the agents appropriate to channelling such reasons in 
institutional discourse. If we accept the generality and reciprocity constraints of justification, 
it seems important to apply such criteria not only to the principles advanced in discursive 
exchange but to the agents that articulate such principles and to the institutional contexts in 
which they operate. This is how the partisan account complements these theories.  
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Partisanship, we have said, provides the agent able to consistently politicise the question 
of peoplehood across time.  To be sure, not all conceptions of peoplehood advanced in 
partisan clashes are desirable, but it is through this process that desirable conceptions can 
emerge. Partisanship is the means by which such conceptions may be given public 
justification and systematically brought to bear on the exercise of power in a way that is to a 
significant degree legitimate, grounded in participation, and resonant with everyday 
experiences of subjection to power structures.  Such moves may draw inspiration from norm-
based perspectives on how peoplehood should be cast, yet go beyond these by publicising 
them and revising them to fit historical circumstances.  This is the distinctiveness of the 
partisan contribution.     
At the same time, the dynamics of partisanship guard against what one might call the 
‘over-politicisation’ of peoplehood in contestation-based perspectives.  Partisanship is about 
the promotion of principled interpretations of the public good rather than the factional pursuit 
of parochial interests and identities.  Rather than just a definitional stipulation, this is a 
corollary of the partisan aim to channel political conflict in a way that critically scrutinises the 
exercise of political power and finds institutional legitimation.  The implication is that such 
agents promote their commitments by seeking conceptions of peoplehood that tend towards 
inclusivity, that foster links between social groups so as to meld them into a shared sense of 
subjecthood (Rosenblum 2008, ch. 7).  Furthermore, the fact that partisans are engaged in an 
continuous institutional process rather than a single moment of antagonism gives them reason 
to avoid interpreting peoplehood in a purely opportunist fashion.  The iterated character of the 
struggle means they must seek to make their interpretation plausible to others.  Agonist 
theorists seek this ‘taming’ of conflict in the adoption of an ethos of respect towards 
opponents; the institutional structure of partisanship provides an account of how this attitude 
can be achieved. 
A strength of a partisan-centred account of the people is that it might partly reconcile us 
to the paradox of composition so familiar in the current philosophical debate on the people.  
Those who note that membership in the people cannot be settled by vote, and that the issue is 
therefore an a-democratic one, imply that the ballot is the essence of democracy.  Underlying 
this is an aggregative conception of democracy in which the collective will is to be identified 
by reference to a number – i.e. the largest figure arrived at by adding up individual 
preferences.  By contrast, to focus on partisanship is to focus on the significance of mediating 
agents whose influence is only partly determined by the sheer numbers of supporters they are 
able to marshal.  Even a partisan group whose electoral returns are quite modest can have a 
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significant impact on public debate (Green parties are a notable example).  Of course, 
insisting on the relevance of these mediating forces for bridging the gap between politics 
understood as an adversarial process and politics as a set of juridical and executive institutions 
still implies that we begin with some existing agents, taking their identity as in part given to 
us. But if we place emphasis on the dynamic evolution and ideas-driven nature of that 
identity, the boundary between a constituted people and an excluded other will not be so 
clear-cut as to render its paradoxical nature troubling (see also Benhabib 2011, chs. 7 and 8). 
Finally, as we have tentatively suggested, partisanship also contains elements of an 
expansive logic, with dynamics that tend towards the widening of the scope of conflict. The 
commitments of at least some partisans will be sufficiently generalizable as to give them 
common cause with others across state borders.  Where their principles have transnational 
reach, they lead to the formation of transnational communities of the likeminded, countering 
thereby a more parochial definition of peoplehood.  This expansive logic will be particularly 
evident if political circumstances evolve such that more narrow articulations of the scope of 
conflict are unable to capture emerging interactions and the forms of political subjecthood 
associated with them.  In a pluralist partisan setting, one can expect some political groupings 
to be making exactly such expansive appeals, their initiatives serving to problematise the 
silences, omissions and exclusionary moves of their adversaries, in some cases forcing them 
to defend their positions in reciprocally justifiable and generalisable terms.
12
   
The partisan construction of ‘the people’ is thus an evolving process structured by 
claims and counter-claims, in which actors seek to shape peoplehood in accordance with the 
commitments they seek to advance, in the face of opposing efforts to promote a competing 
constituency. Differing conceptions of who constitutes ‘the people’ are negotiated in the 
course of these clashes and in response to the principled commitments embedded in them.
13
  
Through this process the ideal of peoplehood implied by the notion of popular sovereignty 
comes to be instantiated in political action – the ‘people in reserve’ linked to the ‘people in 
action’ (Canovan 2005).  While it is important to recognise thresholds that political agents in 
a democracy should clear (framed above in terms of a commitment to communicative 
freedom or a basic claim to justification), subject to these the composition of the people is 
appropriately configured and renegotiated through partisan conflict.   
 
 
4.  Objections 
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For those operating within the framework of the people-as-norm, the suspicion may be that 
this perspective is overly concessive to power-political relations and neutralises some of the 
important normative functions of the concept of ‘the people’.  It might be said that the concept 
needs to be viewed as something which transcends day-to-day politics so that political 
minorities can appeal to it when faced with the overweening demands of a majority.  
Peoplehood, one might argue, needs to be depoliticised.  Dissenting voices need to be able to 
expose dominant political groupings as representing something less than the populus as a 
whole if their power is to be restrained.  These dominant groupings need to be recognisable as 
a part making an imperfect claim to embody the whole.  If ‘the people’ is treated as something 
shaped by partisan politics, the construction of those who are politically successful, there 
would seem little possibility for this type of dissenting view to be articulated (Rummens 
2009). How is the partisan perspective different in that regard? 
One can answer this worry by acknowledging that the contribution of adversarial 
partisanship to the process of people-making does not imply that whatever forms of 
peoplehood emerge from this conflict are ipso facto justified. This is one crucial difference 
from purely agonistic approaches to democracy, where the strengths and weaknesses of 
different normative commitments tend to be glossed over. Assessing these positions and their 
claims to representing the people will require an exercise of moral and political judgment, one 
conducive to the democratic commitment to political justification. Even if specific partisan 
articulations of ‘the people’ vary in their normative appeal, some more attractive than others, 
the process as a whole remains valuable. Any perspective which sees ‘the people’ as an idea 
above political conflict, and therefore a point of consensus, invites a willingness to accept one 
particular conception unquestioningly.  This is objectionable, since no conception will be 
neutral in its political implications; it will legitimize a particular exercise of power, one that 
needs constant scrutiny.  A conception which seeks to settle the issue by reference to cultural 
markers encourages the naturalisation of some markers over others, with adverse 
consequences for those excluded by this particular criterion.  Application of a criterion of 
affectedness (cf. all-affected interests and related criteria) will inevitably exclude those who, 
on a different interpretation of affectedness, might have been included. If the supra-partisan 
character of ‘the people’ is accepted, the legitimacy of these exclusions is likely to appear 
self-evident, and the hardships they result in left unaddressed.  A sceptical disposition towards 
any one interpretation of ‘the people’, grounded in recognition of the concept’s contestability, 
has the merit of rendering these hardships more explicit.  It allows them to be submitted to 
critique and justification.   
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One might argue there is nothing in the process described to guarantee that narrowly 
exclusionary  tendencies do not prevail. This is, certainly, one of the risks associated with the 
openendedness of partisan politics.  Sometimes views that fail to acknowledge even a basic 
right to justification may take centre-stage. But even if morally dubious, such views may be 
politically instructive. They signal to us how, when principled views fail to engage citizens, 
the public sphere is likely to be plagued by more emotional, purely reactive and narrowly self-
serving political appeals. An anti-immigrant partisan group (e.g. the Italian Lega Nord, or the 
French Front National) undoubtedly seeks to exclude from the ‘public’ that informs its 
conception of the public good those whom one might wish to see included.  Such partisans are 
to many observers morally objectionable, but where they are politically successful they 
usefully alert us to the pressing need to promote counter-perspectives and act as a provocation 
to do so.  
A second set of objections might be advanced by those committed to a people-as-
contestation view, who suspect our partisanship-based account insufficiently politicises the 
question of peoplehood.  Partisanship is typically associated with a particular institutional 
arrangement centred on parties, electoral arrangements and voting.  Some will feel this 
weakens the ability of partisans to problematise the issue of who the people are.  If partisans 
are ultimately dependent on votes for political success, are they not likely to have a 
conservative bias in favour of those already included within the political community, at the 
expense of those currently outside, given it is the former who determine their political 
fortunes?  Is the pre-existing allocation of citizenship rights not ultimately the decisive factor, 
shaping the preference structure of partisans?  To the extent that partisans do make claims on 
behalf of non-citizens, should these not be regarded as mainly rhetorical and of little practical 
consequence?  
Such a perspective relies on an overly narrow account of partisanship and imputes 
predominantly self-interested motivations to partisan actors. For every partisan who can be 
cast in these terms, there will be others inclined to evoke the subjectivity of non-citizens on 
principled grounds, regardless of whether the present institutional set-up offers the prospect of 
an electoral dividend. Even were one to assume that most partisans are concerned more with 
power than principle, to conclude that presently existing institutional structures are decisive 
would be wrong.  One need not dwell here on the puzzle of the revolutionary party, whose 
motivations clearly cannot easily be explained with reference to the incentives created by 
existing structures.  Even in the normal democratic context, structuralist perspectives of this 
kind overstate the fixity of political constituencies – a tendency often associated with the 
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parallel one of seeing partisans as representing fixed social interests (White and Ypi 2011).  
Political agents may appeal to the interests of those outside the political community because 
their conception of the public good takes a cosmopolitan form, as many social-justice activists 
have shown. 
A further concern may be that our perspective is ambiguous in its relation to arguments 
in favour of an unbounded conception of peoplehood.  If one argument for the importance of 
partisanship is that it denaturalises the exclusions which inevitably follow any demarcation of 
the people, one might question whether the problem of exclusivity is not most 
straightforwardly dealt with, not by valuing a plurality of conceptions, but by calling 
unequivocally for a global one.  Such a position may seem more principled and clearer in its 
prescriptions.  But a cosmopolitan perspective, though certainly compatible with the argument 
presented here, is not a self-standing alternative to the processes we have described.  For even 
if one grants that the ‘people’ might in principle be unbounded, exclusions remain, not least 
since future generations have relatively weak capacity to shape the agenda of inherited 
institutions. The relationship to power in this case remains as unaccountable to those excluded 
in time as it was to those excluded in space.  If we seek to eradicate such exclusions by 
applying the ‘unboundedness’ principle consistently to both space and time, we end up with a 
potentially infinite expansion of the demos and a perspective so inclusive as to be 
unworkable.
14
  A cosmopolitan vision involves choices therefore if it is to move beyond the 
highly abstract formulation of including everyone, everywhere, on all possible issues, and for 
this reason needs persistent denaturalisation as much as any other conception of the scope of 
the people.  Second, whichever cosmopolitan conception one favours, some type of agent will 
be required to raise its public profile and advance it politically.  Partisanship is again likely to 
be central, whether in the form of international coordination between national parties, or the 
emergence of regional or global parties (Patomäki 2011; White 2014).  Indeed, durable 
political agents that can outlive the individuals that compose them are likely to be especially 
important to the kind of unbounded conception of peoplehood that treats political inclusion 
today as inseparable from its maintenance in the future. 
There is a final objection that may occur to anyone with an eye on contemporary 
politics and the condition of partisanship today.  While acknowledging its centrality to the 
politics of peoplehood as a historical truth, some may doubt whether contemporary 
partisanship can be anything like so influential.  Parties in western democracy today, it may 
be said, do not contest the major political questions, the scope of the people included: they 
operate rather as cartels, intent on shielding themselves from their own grass-roots supporters.  
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Even were they to depart from this model, it is questionable how far they might mobilise large 
numbers of ordinary citizens (Katz & Mair 2009).  Are we not dealing with a political form 
that has long decayed? 
The objection is quite misplaced.  Rather than evidence of partisan irrelevance, the 
scenario described is in large degree of partisan making.
15
  The demobilisation of large 
sections of the modern electorate is testament to the success of those partisans for whom 
popular apathy is convenient.  Low rates of political participation amongst the unemployed, 
the precariously employed, the less educated and the ethnically marginalised, as well as 
institutional arrangements that encourage it – this is what a certain kind of partisan project of 
people-making looks like (on neoliberalism: Crouch 2011).  Regrettable as it may be, it will 
take a partisan counter-project to reverse it, not least because institutions will need to be 
reoriented if some of the political structures fostering such tendencies are to be addressed.  
The success of numerous ‘populist’ parties in contemporary politics, i.e. of partisans making 
claims in the name of ‘the people’, is evidence of the public resonance that counter-projects 
may achieve (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2012).  However undistinguished then the 
condition of many contemporary parties, it would be arbitrary to freeze the film at the current 
frame: partisanship is an ongoing process. The empirical obstacles encountered in that process 
should lead one to reform and rethink the institutional mechanisms traditionally associated 
with partisanship (including its relation to social movements and alternative forms of political 
agency, e.g. those centred on new social media) rather than simply discount the practice. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Let us recapitulate the argument.  A central question that arises in democratic theory concerns 
how to define the democratic subject, ‘the people’.  Political thought provides a repository of 
possible responses, ranging from those that approach the people as norm to those that 
approach it as a matter for contestation.  Here we try to mediate between these perspectives.  
‘The people’ should be approached not merely as something defined in the exceptional 
moment, in the act of a political community’s foundation, and then inherited as the container 
within which politics is to unfold.  Rather it should be seen in processual terms as that which 
is created and revisited in ongoing fashion in the context of political conflict.  But an account 
of this sort needs to consider the mechanisms by which political conflict can be made 
compatible with certain standards of principled justification (White and Ypi 2011), and how 
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peoplehood can be maintained as a participatory phenomenon, something exercised rather 
than merely granted or proclaimed.  
It is in partisanship that we find one plausible systematic response to these questions, 
able to connect normative commitments to practical agency. Partisanship stands as the 
paradigmatic form of political conflict in modern democracy – sufficiently organised and 
institutionalised to bring peoplehood into everyday politics in a way that links it to the 
legitimate exercise of power. Partisans have special reason to contest the scope of the people, 
since its extension is closely tied to the scope of political conflict, something they seek to 
influence so as to shape the terms on which they face their adversaries and frame their visions 
of the public good.  In so doing they give form to something always under-determined by 
philosophical norms.  It is in the context of partisan encounter – pre-eminently, though not 
exclusively – that the idea of ‘the people’ is evoked, defined, disputed and instantiated.  And 
it is from that practice that political theory has much to learn. 
As our remarks have indicated, linking the definition of peoplehood to partisan agency 
results in a perspective neither purely historical nor purely normative.  It is not the former, as 
it acknowledges the normative status of peoplehood claims, the moral thresholds that apply, 
and the ability to adjudicate between different partisan claims.  Principled oppositions are at 
the core of the perspective, and at least some of the conceptions articulated one may be 
inclined to endorse.  Even where all such conceptions are deemed questionable, the very fact 
of contestation serves to put them publicly in question.  At the same time, our perspective is 
not purely normative, since no expectation is placed on there being just one norm of decisive 
appeal.  There will be competing conceptions with ostensibly valid credentials, and 
adjudication between them will be a matter for situated political judgement.  In the account 
proposed, historical development is normatively loaded and normative theory is historically 
situated.  
It follows from what we have argued that any loosening of the tie between partisan 
action and the shaping of the people would have negative implications for the justification of 
political boundaries.  Partisan contestation serves to publicise, render intelligible and refine 
the reasons and objections relevant to any given siting of peoplehood.  Without it, the 
exclusions that necessarily follow from the application of any set of norms risk sedimentation.  
And to rely only on loosely structured political conflict that does not aim to shape and 
articulate principled oppositions runs the risk of moral withdrawal.  ‘The people’, a concept in 
many guises progressive, would then easily mutate into a source of oppression.  To the extent 
that existing dynamics of political conflict take us away from forms of peoplehood we find 
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morally acceptable, they need to be opposed by partisan means.  In sum, the partisan attitude 
should be valued not just for its contribution to the substance of democratic life, but also for 
the possibilities it holds for reconfiguring democracy’s scope, the scope of its distinctive 
subject, ‘the people’. 
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1
 We focus on the larger contribution of partisanship to the process of political justification in White and Ypi 
2011; here our concern is with the more specific concept of ‘the people’ and the relevance of partisan practices 
to its conceptualisation. 
2
 On the importance of justification more generally, see Forst 2011. On the relevance of minimal egalitarian 
democratic requirements see Christiano 2011, who also defends an instrumental right to democracy. For a 
definition of the democratic requirement as commitment to a society of equals but without framing democracy as 
a human right, see Cohen 2006. 
3
 For a more detailed discussion of the limitations of the norm-based view from a methodological 
perspective, see Ypi 2011, ch. 2. 
4
 See also Ypi 2011, ch. 2 and Ypi 2013 for the importance of diagnosis to the process of identifying plausible 
responses to political conflict. 
5
 For an earlier discussion linking uneven levels of political engagement to questions of peoplehood, see 
Schattschneider 1975, pp.96ff. 
6
 Consider for example the evocation of an idea of ‘the people’ transnational in scope in the call of activists 
(including student groups, trade unionists, Labour MPs and party members) joining the March 2011 
demonstration against austerity cuts in London: ‘On March 26 we are inviting everyone to join us to stay in 
Trafalgar Square for 24 hours to discuss how we can beat this government and to send a message across the 
globe that we stand with the people of Egypt, Libya, Wisconsin and with all those fighting for equality, freedom 
and justice. We want to turn Trafalgar square into a place of people’s power where we assert our alternative to 
cuts and austerity and make it a day that this Government won’t forget’ (http://march26tahrir.wordpress.com/the-
call/).  It is a provocative call, and clearly not all will agree with the logic of equivalence it asserts: did the 
protesters in London really share common challenges and adversaries with their counterparts in Egypt, Libya and 
the US as they claim?  Their contention is that the structures of global capitalism produce a similar set of 
struggles across the globe between privileged local elites and ‘the people’ subjected to the same unfair system of 
global rules. Whether one accepts the substantive argument is secondary to the point that here one sees an effort 
to redefine the people under contentious conditions and thereby to challenge existing alignments. 
7
 Elsewhere we explain the relationship between partisanship and the party in analogy to the relation between the 
nation and the state, where the nation is often understood as an imagined community of socio-cultural practices 
and the state as a body of institutions giving visibility to the nation. Although a particular party gives empirical 
form to a particular partisan community, the overlap between party and partisanship may be imperfect, just as the 
overlap between nation and state may be imperfect (White and Ypi forthcoming). 
8
 This, of course, is not to exclude that other forms of political engagement may sometimes play the same role, 
especially in circumstances where partisanship is in crisis or deteriorates to a series of factional disputes of 
minimal principled content. But where such alternative agents come to the fore, their intervention in the public 
sphere and their contribution to disputes over the scope of the people will resemble the partisanship with which 
this article is concerned. 
9
 Consider for instance the events of the Arab Spring, the partisan component of which was generally fairly small 
relative to spontaneous uprising (and arguably regrettably so – cf. Tariq Ali, ‘What is a Revolution?’, 
http://tariqali.org/archives/2629). 
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10
 Not all partisans are successful in winning institutional office, of course, but certainly none rejects the 
possibility on principle in the way many social movements, keen to avoid organisation and political compromise, 
choose to. 
11
 For a longer discussion of the provisional nature of legitimacy as it applies to territorial rights within a Kantian 
framework, see Ypi 2014. For an example of the role of political community as it applies to the European Union, 
see Ypi 2008. 
12
 On transnational partisanship and its normative aspects, see White 2014. 
13
 Whether this clash between partisan agents serves to illuminate independently valid ideal configurations of the 
people (as in epistemic views of justification) or to create the most plausible conceptions (as in proceduralist 
alternatives) is an issue we need not decide for the purposes of this article. Both answers are compatible with the 
defence of partisanship offered. 
14
 Goodin, for example, defends such a ‘possibilist’, expansionary version of the all-affected principle which 
universalizes the demos in both time and space but then proceeds to narrow it for the sake of practical feasibility 
and endorses the institutions of the territorially-defined state constrained by mechanisms of global 
accountability. 
15
  Not exclusively, of course: there are other socio-economic factors involved which cannot be reduced to 
partisan design. 
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